It has been more than two months since the deadly Aricell battery plant fire that killed 23 people – 18 of them migrant workers.^{1 2}The tragedy has been identified as South Korea’s “deadliest industrial disaster for migrant workers.”³ On 13 August, more than 50 days after the tragedy, the South Korean Ministry of Employment and Labor announced the results of a special work inspection of Aricell, which included 65 violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, as well as safety measures for migrant workers. The results of the investigation by the police were announced on 23 August. The police investigation revealed that Aricell had committed various crimes against the Ministry of National Defense, including: 

• rapidly increasing the battery defect rate and failing to take action against new defective types; 
• using a large number of migrant workers while blatantly ignoring safety measures, such as stopping and improving the screening of thermoelectric cells; and 
• switching samples, in order to meet the delivery date for military batteries.

The investigation by the Ministry of Employment and Labor confirmed some suspicions about Aricell’s illegal operation. The details surrounding the tragedy are slowly emerging, but the Aricell Committee Against Fatal Disasters is still fighting for the truth about the tragedy and calling for measures to prevent its recurrence.⁴

Based on the facts mentioned above, it can be said that the Aricell tragedy was a disaster waiting to happen. Prior to the announcement of the results of the investigation by the police and the Ministry of Employment and Labor, various media reports and parliamentary offices revealed that Aricell routinely failed to comply with relevant laws. Various warnings from authorities were ignored as if they did not exist. In short, the disaster occurred while Aricell was operating in defiance of the law.

Consequences of ignoring warnings from fire authorities

Aricell completely ignored warnings from fire authorities about weaknesses in fire and explosion preparedness. On March 5, 2024, three months before the tragedy, the head of the Namyang 119 Safety Center of the Hwaseong Fire Department visited the Aricell factory for fire prevention consulting. They explained the characteristics of lithium used in battery manufacturing and emergency response methods, and inspected the lithium storage facility. At that time, the head of the Namyang 119 Safety Center instructed Aricell to do the following:

• thoroughly comply with safety rules for handling dangerous goods; 
• conduct its own fire drills; 
• and provide information to workers on the characteristics of dangerous goods in case of a fire.

In addition, company officials were informed that ‘rapid evacuation using the main entrance is necessary’ in the event of a fire. The ‘Firefighting Activity Data Survey Report of Namyang 119 Safety Center of Hwaseong Fire Department’ prepared on March 28^th after the consultation stated that the three buildings of the Aricell factory were:

• an area where multiple casualties were likely to occur; 
• a risk of casualties due to rapid combustion of the product in the production line located in Building 3; and 
• a risk of rapid combustion due to factors that could expand combustion in the event of a fire in 11 buildings.

Following the disaster, police investigations revealed a history of four lithium battery fires at the company: two in 2021, one in 2022, and one in June 2024, two days before the deadly tragedy. Aricell consistently covered up lithium battery fires and explosions and ignored warnings from fire authorities.

Aricell’s risk assessments did not include fire and explosion hazards

Ironically, the Korea Occupational Safety & Health Agency selected Aricell as an excellent workplace for risk assessment. From February 2021 to February 2024, the company received a reduction in workers’ compensation insurance premiums worth KRW 5.8 million (~USD$4,212 or €3,884). The risk assessment claimed that the employer and safety and health personnel were well trained and worked on-site, and that they were making great efforts to manage and improve the safety and health of workers.

A risk assessment should be conducted by an employer with the participation of workers at the workplace for all hazards and risks to which workers are known to be exposed or can be reasonably foreseen to be exposed during their work (Article 36 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act). If Aricell workers had been told by the company that lithium batteries ‘can catch fire,’ and if they knew about the history of repeated fires at the company, then they would have expected that the risk assessment would include lithium battery fires and explosions. Even if lithium fires and explosions were not included in the regular risk assessment, if a fire occurred, then the company should have been prepared for this possibility and included the issue in its ongoing risk assessment. Even if a topic was not previously assessed, if a risk has materialized, then it should be assessed.

Issues that emerged during the safety and health management system consultation

At the end of March 2024, Aricell received the first consultation on its safety and health management system through an organization entrusted by the Korea Occupational Safety & Health Agency. The report showed that executives and managers were highly motivated, that the worker information boards were in place, and that the warehouse for storing raw materials and products was managed separately. However, it was found that the wall between the warehouse for storing lithium battery products and the workshop was illegally altered and demolished. The fact that more than 35,000 pieces of battery products were loaded in the packaging and inspection workshop where the lithium battery fire and explosion occurred is enough to confirm that the claim in the consultation report that the company had a ‘separate storage warehouse’ is not true. It is suspected that the consulting company did not conduct an on-site inspection.

Safety training was virtually non-existent

Aricell CEO, Park Soon-kwan, denied that the workers had any employment relationship with Aricell, saying that the majority of the victims were temporary workers. However, Maycell, the outsourcing company, denied the allegations, saying that, “it supplied labor over the phone without knowing their faces.” In this situation where no one acted as the employer, the workers received no safety training or fire evacuation drills. CCTV footage from the day of the tragedy shows the workers running around, unaware of emergency procedures. Even with minimal awareness of the power of lithium battery fires and explosions, the victims might have rushed to evacuate.

The company ignored the harmful, dangerous nature of the lithium battery manufacturing process

Lithium is classified as a Class 3 hazardous substance (water-reactive substances and flammable solids) under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. As a lithium handling business, Aricell was required to take measures such as:

• installing at least one emergency exit in addition to the entrance; 
• taking measures to prevent explosions, fires, and leaks;
• creating a classification map of explosion hazard areas and taking management measures accordingly; and 
• properly laying out the workplace to prevent fires.

If the minimum measures stipulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Act had been taken, the disaster might not have occurred. In addition, Aricell used a number of hazardous chemicals, including thionyl chloride, an accident prevention substance, in its lithium battery manufacturing process. However, as the results of the special labor inspection showed, the workers did not receive health checks or material safety and health training. Aircell left workers at hazardous and dangerous sites, as evidenced by the failure to install gas detection and alarm systems for flammable liquids, the failure to designate explosion hazard areas, and the failure to comply with wind speed standards for controlling local exhaust systems. 

In addition, the Aricell disaster has confirmed problems such as the lack of fire and disaster prevention measures for lithium battery fires and explosions, violations of building laws such as illegal structural changes, and failure to conduct inspections or establish safety accident prevention measures in accordance with the Chemical Substances Control Act. Two factors contributed to the Aricell disaster: 1) the risk management practices of Aricell, which has been operating in defiance of the law and with disregard for the safety and health of its workers, and 2) the risk management practices of the authorities, who have virtually ignored these high-risk workplaces under the pretext of administrative capacity. The investigation by the police and the Ministry of Employment and Labor on 23 August is only part of what has been revealed about Aricell’s criminal behavior. Through the investigation, the various problems that led to the Aricell disaster should be diagnosed, and measures to prevent recurrence should be established. This is the minimum that society owes to the victims of the Aricell tragedy.

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Jinwoo Son, Korean Institute of Labor Safety and Health (KILSH) and Aricell Committee Against Fatal Disasters

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1.  This article was originally published in the September 2024 issue of Ilteo (Workplace), the monthly magazine of the Korean Institute of Labor Safety and Health. ↩︎
2.  Goh GJ (2024) Aricell battery plant fire was Korea’s deadliest industrial disaster for migrant workers, experts say, Hankyoreh https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1150350.html ↩︎
3. Goh GJ (2024) Aricell battery plant fire was Korea’s deadliest industrial disaster for migrant workers, experts say, Hankyoreh https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/1150350.html ↩︎
4.  On 24 September 2024, prosecutors announced that they charged Park Soon-kwan, the company’s CEO, with violating the Serious Accidents Punishment Act, the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Prosecutors also charged Park’s son, Park Joong-un, 35, the general manager of the company, with violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the Act on the Protection, etc. of Temporary Agency Workers, causing accidental death and injury, and obstructing business. The two were detained in August. ↩︎